Background and Approach
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 created the Medicare Hospice Benefit (MHB) to improve the lives of terminally ill Medicare beneficiaries. Hospice care is covered under Medicare Part A and is a comprehensive set of services identified and coordinated by an interdisciplinary team to provide for the physical, psychosocial, spiritual, and emotional needs of terminally ill patients and their families under a patient-driven plan of care (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2018a) . Since the creation of the MHB, the utilization of hospice services has increased perennially, with significant acceleration over the past decade. Despite hospice being a covered Medicare benefit and the increased utilization in hospice services, it remains carved out of the Medicare Advantage (MA) benefits package. MA plans are managed care plans that are paid a monthly fee per member by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to provide Medicare benefits.
The exclusion of hospice care from the MA program creates a complicated set of coverage requirements for an MA member who wants to elect hospice care. Before the election of hospice services, the MA plan covers all Part A, B, and D services and any supplemental benefits. After the member elects hospice care, traditional Medicare covers hospice care, as well as Part A and B services unrelated to the terminal prognosis. In this scenario, the MA plan continues to cover Part D drugs unrelated to the terminal condition and any supplemental benefits. Finally, if a member decides to disenroll from hospice, then traditional Medicare will cover all Part A and B services until the end of the month, while the MA plan will cover all Part D drugs and any supplemental benefits for the month and then resume covering Part A and B services beginning the next month after disenrollment. This complicated set of coverage requirements is just one reason there have been calls to include hospice care in the MA benefits package. This "carve-in," as it is often referred to, was most prominently recommended by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) in 2014 and has been the subject of somewhat continuous chatter ever since. More recently, the Senate Finance Committee included the carve-in in its Bipartisan Chronic Care Working Group Policy Options document.
Currently, a policy to include hospice care in the MA benefits package aligns nicely with policies that expand MA and create innovation to improve end-of-life care. A carve-in policy, however, is fraught with complexity. The goal of this brief is to describe trends that precipitated the call for a carvein; assess the idiosyncrasies of this issue that have stymied action; and explore the implications and opportunities of a policy to include hospice care in the MA benefits package.
Analysis

Motivation for a Carve-In
There are at least three compelling reasons to consider a policy that would include hospice care in the MA benefits Public Policy & Aging Report cite as: Public Policy & Aging Report, 2018 , Vol. 28, No. 3, 100-104 doi:10.1093 package. First, the perennial growth in MA enrollment and hospice election create the natural conditions for discussion of a carve-in. As seen in Figure 1 , since 2000 the percentage of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in MA plans has doubled (Jacobson, Damico, Neuman, & Gold, 2017) , as did the proportion of Medicare decedents using hospice (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2017) . Moreover, there has been a substantial increase in the number of hospice providers and amount of Medicare expenditures on hospice services (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2017).
The similarities persist further, in that both MA enrollment and hospice utilization are characterized by substantial variations within the general trend of persistent growth. The average MA penetration rate by state was 33% in 2017, but ranged from 3-56% (Jacobson et al., 2017) . The variation in MA penetration is largely attributed to differences in the historical foothold of managed care across states, the presence of employer-sponsored insurance for retirees, and investments in states by MA plans (Jacobson et al., 2017) . The percentage of Medicare decedents using hospice by state in 2016 averaged 24-59% (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2018b) . As with other variations in health care utilization (The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, 2017), this variation in hospice election is generally viewed as a signal that the full value of hospice care is not being systematically realized. For example, hospice care is a benefit designed for people in the last months of life, yet the median length of stay and average length of stay in hospice are 18 and 88 days, respectively (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2018). The wide range in hospice utilization among beneficiaries results in over half of Medicare hospice spending being used for patients with stays exceeding 180 days (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2018) .
While the MA and hospice growth trends happened in parallel and the MHB is housed only within the confines of traditional Medicare, it is not necessarily true that the two entities are unaffected by one another. The 2014 MedPAC report that recommended the carve-in presented an extensive argument advocating for hospice care to be included in the MA benefits package. The core of their argument centered on concerns that the structure of the benefit "makes a plan's financial responsibility for end-of-life care uneven across beneficiaries" (p. 344) (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2014) . This uneven responsibility, a reflection of the fact that MA beneficiaries electing hospice make an early exit from their MA plans, may disincentivize plans to critically think about serious illness strategies. For the MA beneficiary population, the MHB has arguably imposed an artificial, payment-driven discontinuity on what could otherwise be a smooth, clinical continuum of care, creating potentially perverse incentives in navigating this gap and disrupting what would otherwise be a natural clinical segue at a critical juncture in a terminally ill person's disease trajectory.
Second, broader payment reform trends have also started to encroach on the MHB, which is usually impervious to the payment rumblings that have largely targeted traditional Medicare. While typically excluded from most reform efforts, such as risk-bearing arrangements, hospice expenditures are included in the expenditure calculation for Medicare's Pioneer, Shared Savings Program, and Next Generation accountable care organization (ACO) models (Driessen & West, 2017) . The ACO expenditure calculations, when compared to benchmarks, are used to determine the amount of shared savings or risk an organization is allotted, and thus ACO entities are held financially accountable for the hospice expenditures incurred by their aligned beneficiaries (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2014) . This represents a fundamental shift in the positioning of hospice in the health care organizational chart, in which hospice has traditionally been excluded from efforts to create formal ties and coordination across service lines. Thus, the financial incentive exists in these models for ACO entities to more strategically consider how hospice fits into the trajectory of care and to take a more active role in ensuring timely and judicious utilization of hospice care for their patients. In parallel, the ongoing efforts to provide MA plans more autonomy generally reflect the similar belief that these plans are incentivized to identify inefficiencies in utilization because of the capitated nature of their reimbursement. In short, including hospice care in the MA benefits package synchronizes payment and accountability across Medicare payment policies. Third and finally, a carve-in could motivate MA plans to develop a serious-illness strategy that supports members through the end of life. Plans may use a carve-in to better identify patients living with serious and terminal illnesses and titrate up access to palliative care services and hospice care as a person declines or goals of care change.
Idiosyncrasies as Challenges
Despite a convergence of hospice growth, MA empowerment, and payment reform ostensibly teeing up an inclusion of hospice in the MA benefits package, there has been little traction in specifying the fine print of such a policy shift. A number of quirks of the hospice payment policy landscape have contributed to this inability of the inclusion idea to take hold beyond the low-level thrum of being raised as a possibility.
First, the policy change lacks any clear constituency serving as a driving advocate for this shift. A version of the carve-in was included in an early draft of the Creating High-Quality Results and Outcomes Necessary to Improve Chronic Care Act, but was eventually dropped. Hospice advocacy organizations have long been opposed to such a change, and the topic has received mixed, but overall rather dispassionate interest, from MA plans. Medicare beneficiary advocacy organizations have taken, at best, a cautious stance, concerned about what a carve-in would mean for beneficiary access at such a vulnerable stage of life, such as whether it would restrict the patient's choice of hospice providers.
Second, such a policy consideration requires a deft touch, given the potential for a revival of the "death panels" messaging on this issue (Frankford, 2015) . Mixing notions of efficiencies and care for the dying is no doubt a minefield, and thus a viable proposal on this issue would need to be widely viewed as an unequivocal win for beneficiaries. A primary concern in this domain is preserving patient choice.
Status Quo as an Opportunity
And yet, despite the practical and political barriers to pursuing the inclusion of hospice care in the MA benefits package, the baseline for serious illness and end-of-life care in our current system is widely regarded as inadequate, suggesting that a shake-up might not be entirely unwelcome. It is not difficult to find evidence to support the view that end-of-life care is not living up to any aspect of the triple aim-improving patient experience of care, improving population health, and decreasing per capita cost of health care-with a wealth of evidence documenting utilization that is both clinically ineffective and not reflective of patient preferences. A glass half-full view of the status quo is that it leaves plenty of opportunity for policy to catalyze change that generates improvement along multiple dimensions at the end of life, such as bolstering the patient experience while improving the efficiency of utilization. A recent Institute of Medicine report, Dying in America, recommended more timely hospice access as a means of improving end-of-life care (Institute of Medicine Committee on Approaching Death: Addressing Key Endof-Life Issues, 2015).
This type of opportunity is critical, because it implies that, at least in theory, there is a way to construct a carve-in that generates triple aim improvements without hard trade-offs, making it possible for providers, patients, and payers to all come out ahead, or at least have no one worse off. For example, an inclusion could incentivize MA plans to form relationships with higherquality hospice providers and improve patient awareness of hospice care, a known hurdle currently to improving access to this service. Similarly, a hospice carve-in changes the balance of costs and benefits around palliative care, which targets patients at any stage of a serious illness and is often positioned as a precursor to hospice election. If plans are uniformly responsible for all care through the end of life for beneficiaries, they may be more likely to invest in palliative care programs that improve articulation and adherence to patient preferences, which often reduce unnecessary and expensive utilization (Kavalieratos et al., 2016) .
In short, basic economic theory indicates that the lack of both clinical and financial prudency in current endof-life utilization creates an opening for a more strategic utilization of hospice that improves clinical and patientcentered outcomes while saving or maintaining current expenditures. This is relevant to the broader timbre of the health care payment reform movement, in that it echoes the stated goal of new models embraced by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2018d) .
Devil in the Details
And yet, resistance to a MA carve-in is long-standing and sourced from all three of the provider, payer, and patient domains, despite the aforementioned possibility of an outcome that could generate improvements for all three entities. While concerns are varied, across perspectives there is a universal echo of disquiet about what such a proposal would look like and how other In short, basic economic theory indicates that the lack of both clinical and financial prudency in current end-oflife utilization creates an opening for more strategic utilization of hospice that improves clinical and patientcentered outcomes while saving or maintaining current expenditures. stakeholders would respond. These concerns about the fine print of a carve-in generally encompass the following themes.
Flexibility
Supporters of MA argue that the existence of market incentives and pressures for these plans result in greater efficiency and value of health care. Thus, advocates generally prefer fewer restrictions on how plans can operate, arguing that excessive limitations stifle innovation that benefits the entire health care sector. For example, plan proponents may prefer more latitude in how plans negotiate with hospices, potentially allowing for the creativity in payment arrangements and care models that has been seen in the home health arena. One could envision departures from the capitated daily rate and the emergence of condition-specific bundles and other risk-bearing models (Meier, 2011; Stevenson, 2012) .
Meanwhile, skeptics of a carve-in voice concerns that imposing a market structure on hospice care may actually spur a "race to the bottom" or result in skimping or low-quality care, given the known challenge of monitoring quality. While potentially acknowledging how flexibility could generate innovation in care delivery, this position focuses instead on the lower tail of the distribution that this flexibility creates. For example, if rate setting and structure were left to the plans and hospices to sort out, plans might be incentivized to partner with hospices that provide a less robust set of services, and might not invest as thoroughly in some of the less clinical intangibles of the hospice model, such as volunteer services and bereavement support. Stakeholders, such as patient and family advocates, may object to such a shift if it adversely affects the hospice experience of care.
In short, navigating the flexibility needed to spur innovation with the guardrails required to maintain patient access and experience is a complicated balance to strike, and is the aggregate of a multitude of potential policy choices, including how payment rates are set between hospices and plans (e.g., fixed, negotiable within corridors, no limitations) and how quality is measured and incorporated into Medicare reimbursement levels.
Measuring Quality
Measuring quality is a vexing problem that continues to plague the U.S. health care delivery system in myriad ways. Identifying quality in end-of-life care is particularly challenging given the range in goals of care for patients and variation in lengths of stay in hospice. The Hospice Quality Reporting Program, mandated by the Affordable Care Act of 2010, represents a good first step toward identifying high-quality hospice care, but limitations abound. The Hospice Quality Reporting Program consists of two components: (a) the Hospice Item Set represents data submitted by hospice providers, but these measures are topped out, yielding little variation to distinguish quality care; and (b) the Hospice Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems is an attempt to capture the experience of care from the perspective of the primary caregiver. While laudable, grief and the timeliness of survey collection complicate this approach. The lack of quality measures to distinguish a high-quality hospice provider will complicate efforts to identify high-quality hospices and develop payment arrangements that link payment with quality, which makes it difficult to avoid plan and provider negotiation solely based on price.
Not only is defining quality at the end of life difficult, assessing the impact of a policy to include hospice care in the MA benefits package is a challenge as well. What does success look like under this model? More timely access to hospice care? The development of serious illness strategies in MA? Thus, the quality measurement conundrum surfaces in multiple ways, including how MA plans would evaluate hospices, how CMS would evaluate MA hospice performance, and how a carve-in policy would be monitored.
Establishing Reimbursement
Innovation is not free, and is indeed often accompanied by substantial fixed costs. It is also risky, making the status quo a comfortable place to stay if the potential margin is too low. The monthly benchmark fee paid to MA plans by CMS is risk-adjusted. Currently, the benchmark payment is a function of expected utilization excluding hospice care, and thus would need to be adjusted in the event of a MA hospice carvein. The appetite for tweaking the hospice delivery and finance model will largely depend on the amount that plans are additionally compensated for providing hospice care, which will determine the business case for a reimagining of how to deliver hospice care.An inclusion of hospice in the MA benefits package is likely to affect both the baseline rate and the risk adjustment process, if we believe that using hospice care affects overall expenditures and that utilization and impact vary by the factors used in risk adjustment.
Overcoming Knowledge Barriers
The MHB effectively legislated hospice off the radar of MA plans, and vice versa. Thus, this artificial payment barrier has created very real knowledge barriers that will affect the early days of a MA hospice inclusion. For Medicare beneficiaries, hospices are accustomed to dealing with a single payer, traditional Medicare, and while they may have experience negotiating with commercial and Medicaid managed-care plans, the scope and scale of MA discussions is likely to be quite different, and any additional flexibility granted under such a carve-in policy would also change the tenor of such an interaction. Similarly, MA plans have not interacted with hospice as an included benefit, and thus may not have not had reason to fully understand the nuances of the hospice model. Again, this hurdle may be offset for larger plans that have Medicaid managed care or commercial arms, and also would be mitigated by exposure to similar service lines, such as home health. Nonetheless, the unique characteristics of hospice care, and the flexibility potentially created by a carve-in policy and by virtue of the large number 'N' of Medicare hospice beneficiaries, sets the stage for some initial knowledge barriers that may hamper collaboration between plans and providers.
Knowledge barriers inhibit both innovation and the triple aim improvements such a policy endeavors to cultivate. Similar challenges were anticipated with the recent passage of SB 1004 in California, which mandated a palliative care benefit for MediCal managed care plans. Implementation of the legislation was accompanied by extensive educational materials.
Conclusion
Against the backdrop of payment reform that increasingly directly infuses quality of care into payment, and incentivizes coordination of care across the clinical silos that are the traditional building blocks of our health care system, the hospice sector has been clinically and financially isolated; the requirement to give up curative care to enter hospice causes a clinical bifurcation, and the capitated, single-payer approach to Medicare hospice beneficiaries was traditionally largely untouched since its inception by payment reform. This is a quirky baseline on which to overlay a carve-in, and this brief summarized the opportunities, challenges, and idiosyncrasies of such an endeavor. While MedPAC's 2014 argument on this issue advocated for an overnight change of the law to include hospice in the MA benefits package, another, more temperate option is to stand up a demonstration of such a carve-in. Though there is an air of "demonstration fatigue," a possible advantage of such a strategy is that it would allow for some controlled experimentation of aspects such as reimbursement and quality measurement, while also allowing both MA plans and hospices to conquer the flatter part of the learning curve around adjudicating a carve-in. This type of general mechanism is in place in the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation's Value-Based Insurance Design program (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2018c) , and a number of organizations are currently developing their own carve-in demonstration proposals.
